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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

HAS RUSSELL ANSWERED HUME?

BERTRAND Russell in *Human Knowledge*, his *magnum opus* in pure philosophy, has created a new and powerful logic of non-demonstrative inference. This new logic centers in Russell's so-called structural postulate, which he has summarily stated as follows:

> The inferences from experiences to the physical world can, I think, all be justified by the assumption that there are causal chains, each member of which is a complex structure ordered by the spatio-temporal relation of compresence (or of contiguity); that all the members of such a chain are similar in structure; that each member is connected with each other by a series of contiguous structures; and that when a number of such similar structures are found to be grouped about a center earlier in time than any of them, it is probable that they all have their causal origin in a complex event which is at that center and has a structure similar to the structure of the observed events. I shall, at a later stage, endeavor to give greater precision to this assumption, and to show reasons for accepting it.[1]

Two very large achievements are claimed for this logic by Russell. (1) He claims that he has provided an answer to the so-called Humean scepticism,[2] which he has wanted[3] and promised[4] for years to try to answer. (2) He claims that this logic of non-demonstrative inference provides, unlike previous defective ones, a justification for the inferences of common sense and science which any reasonable man would care to make.[5]

Attention in this essay will be devoted to examining Russell's claim to have answered Hume's alleged scepticism. An illustrious dynasty, starting with Kant, have tried to answer Hume, but failed. Has Russell succeeded? The task thus set is a simple and definite one, which may be adequately executed in a sequence of three steps: (1) a survey of Hume's logic of inductive inference in order to

[1] Russell, *Human Knowledge* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1948), p. 228.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 174–175, 181, 467.

[3] Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York, Simon and Schuster), pp. 659, 673.

[4] Russell, "My Mental Development," in Schilpp, *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* (The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. V), p. 17; Russell, "Reply to Criticisms," *ibid.*, p. 684.

[5] Russell, *Human Knowledge*, pp. 228, 487, 494.

single out what reasons he gives for accepting his causal principle; (2) a survey of Russell's logic of non-demonstrative inference in order to see what reasons he gives for accepting his causal postulates; (3) a comparison of the two sets of reasons to see whether Russell's are (a) different from Hume's and (b) better than Hume's.

I

Hume's logic of inductive inference falls into two main parts. In one part, he is concerned with formulation of a doctrine of causality, particularly his doctrine concerning the nature and epistemic role of the principle of universal causation. In the other, which he treats only briefly, he adopts the usual special logical techniques of enumerative induction which, when used in conjunction with the principle of universal causality and statements about observed connections among events, enable one to infer special causal laws of nature. These special techniques were formulated crudely by Bacon in his *Novum Organum*, were systematically stated and adopted by Hume,[6] and were given a reformulation and a set of names by Mill which have been accepted as the classical expression of the so-called canons of inductive inference. Although these canons are an integral part of Hume's logic of induction, there is nothing novel in his adoption of them; nothing more, therefore, will be said about them.

The critical center and original core of Hume's logic of induction is contained in his treatment of the principle of universal causation, both its role in the development of our matter-of-fact knowledge and the nature of the grounds for this principle. The treatment may be summarized in seven theses, if we are willing to omit details in the interest of major features of his work.

I. *The indispensability thesis.*[7] Knowledge of matters of fact not observed depends upon a relation of causation between facts observed and those not observed; only such a relation enables one to infer the latter from the former. (a) This applies both to inference of particular unobserved facts from observed facts by use of special causal laws and to inference of special causal laws from observed facts by use of the principle of universal causation. (b) In examining inferred knowledge, therefore, attention may be concentrated upon the principle of universal causation indispensable for inferring special causal laws from observed sequences of facts.

[6] Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1888), Book I, Part III, Section XV.

[7] *Ibid.*, Book I, Part III, Section II.

If it be accepted, then both special laws and particular unobserved facts can be inferred from observed facts in accordance with the regular canons of inductive inference; if it be without basis, then all such inferences are baseless. This leads to the question, what grounds, if any, there are for accepting the principle of universal causation. The next six theses summarize Hume's doctrine on this fundamental question.

II. *The non-analyticity thesis.*[8] The principle of universal causation is not an analytic proposition, that is, it is not one whose negation is a self-contradictory statement. This is equivalent to saying that the principle is a synthetic one.

III. *The generality thesis.*[9] The principle of universal causation is not based upon direct observation; it is a general proposition about the course of nature and hence can not be verified by *direct* perception and memory alone.

IV. *The thesis of the non-inferential character of the principle of causality.*[10] The principle of universal causation can not be *inferred* from particular facts of perception and memory, no matter how numerous, since these facts alone provide only particular propositions, which allow no new conclusion to be drawn, not even a particular conclusion, least of all a general conclusion. Also, if one supplements these facts with some general synthetic principle in order to infer the universal principle of causality, one will be begging the question, for it is this very universal principle of causality which is itself presupposed in any inference from particular facts to any generalization. Consequently, the principle of causality needed for inductive inferences is itself an uninferred principle, general and synthetic in character.

V. *The groundlessness thesis.*[11] *Consequently, if we adhere to the traditional stringent Cartesian conception of knowledge,* which demands that all knowledge be either intuitively self-evident (either to reason or to the senses) or derived by inference from intuitively self-evident truths of reason or the senses, *then there is no way at*

[8] *Ibid.*, Book I, Part III, Section III; Book I, Part III, Section XIV.

[9] *Ibid.*, Book I, Part III, Section III.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] *Ibid.*, Book I, Part III, Section XII: "Let men be once fully perswaded of these two principles, *That there is nothing in any object, consider'd in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it;* and, *That even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience;* I say, let them be once fully convinc'd of these two principles, and this will throw them so loose from all common systems, that they will make no difficulty of receiving any, which may appear the most extraordinary."

all in which we may be said to know the principle of universal causation.

VI. *The thesis of scepticism.*[12] Consequently, since the principle of universal causation is indispensable to building up the body of common-sense and scientific knowledge and since it can not itself in any traditional sense of "knowledge" be known, *it follows that, if we adhere to this traditional rigorous conception of knowledge,* there is no hitherto accepted sense in which we may be said to know any special laws of nature (such as that food is nourishing), nor any unobserved facts (such as whether the sun will rise tomorrow) by means of valid inferences from special laws known to be true and facts observed in perception and memory. Though analytic propositions and impression statements are not called in question, since they are either intuitively self-evident (to reason or to the senses) or are inferred from intuitively self-evident truths, all our other knowledge-claims, which are our really important ones, are found to be indefensible, wholly indefensible, *in terms of the traditionally accepted conception of knowledge.* This is solipsism of the present moment.

What Hume has done in these areas of his philosophy has been to draw out to its inevitable conclusion the strict Cartesian conception of knowledge as a collection of intuitively self-evident propositions and propositions inferrible from self-evident propositions.

The precise sense in which Hume's critique of the principle of universal causation leads to utter scepticism, therefore, is this: He has conclusively shown that *if we adhere to the traditional stringent conception of knowledge then we do not know the principle of universal causality, and therefore,* since this principle is an indispensable basis for all inferred knowledge, *we do not know any causal laws at all, and we do not know any particular facts at all save those of perception and perhaps memory.*

This is the destructive portion of Hume's work, a *reductio ad adsurdum* refutation of the strict Cartesian epistemology. Actually, this is the least original and, to Hume, the least prized part of his epistemology. It is the part that most impresses his critics, but is almost never understood by them, for they usually think they, in showing that these arguments of Hume's lead to this solipsistic conclusion, are criticizing him, and reducing *his* system to absurdity.

Hume himself clearly rejected this strict Cartesian epistemology and its solipsistic outcome. He struggled against it. To avoid it, he introduced a new and liberalized conception of what constitutes knowledge. In terms of this new sense of "knowledge," we may

[12] *Ibid.*

be said to know not only the intuitively self-evident items of reason and the senses but also the principle of causality, special causal laws, and unobserved facts. This is the positive and original portion of Hume's theory of knowledge, bent upon creating new foundations for confidence in our inferred conclusions. It may now be summarized as the seventh thesis of Hume's logic of inductive inference.

VII. *Liberalized redefinition of "knowledge."* [13] Although we can know neither the universal principle of causality nor any special laws of nature nor any unobserved particular facts with intuitive self-evidence nor by means of valid inferences from premises which we know to be intuitively self-evident, still there is another wholly different sense in which we may be said to know all of these, which does not require self-evident premises about nature. This new sense of knowing consists in our having acquired habits of expectation which are generated in us by the influence of sequences in experience, in accordance with the usual laws of habit formation, called by Hume the laws of the association of ideas or, more simply, merely the imagination. Hume's originality in theory of knowledge lies in his formulation and use of these laws of the imagination to explain in what sense we may be said to know certain general truths which the Cartesians mistakenly thought could be known by means of the strict method of rational self-evidence recognized in their systems.

The central mechanism used by Hume is the general principle that whenever several members of a class have been found each to be associated with some member of another class, then, on subsequent occasions, the presentation of any member of the first class awakens in us an expectation of a member of the second class. This is the most important of the laws of the imagination, though not the only one. In terms of it, Hume is able to develop an account of the sense in which we may be said to know unobserved particular facts, special laws of nature, and even the law of universal causation. In this account, no such procedure as logically valid inference from premises known to be self-evidently true is needed at all.

In this new and liberal conception of knowledge, which may be called "a psychologistic redefinition of knowledge," the validity of inferred knowledge is based ultimately upon the psychological fact that we have an acquired habit of expecting events to occur in accordance with the universal law of causation and upon the

[13] *Ibid.*, Book I, Part III, Sections IV–VIII, XIII, XVI; Book I, Part IV, Section VII.

epistemological decision to regard such expectations as a respectable kind of knowledge. This liberalized conception of knowledge, fundamental to Hume's positive work, marks a break with the strict Cartesian conception of knowledge, a launching of non-intuitive conceptions of *all* synthetic knowledge, and a new beginning in modern epistemology.

This interpretation of Hume's logic of inductive inference is supported by two crucial passages, in addition to the general character of his treatment of causality: (1) In his setting up of the strict conception of knowledge, in his *Treatise*[14] and his *Enquiry*,[15] which he employs in criticizing the principle of causality, he accepts the Cartesian scheme with its emphasis upon intuitive and demonstrable certainties as the only kinds of knowledge.[16] His negative work consists in working out the implications of this theory for doctrine of causality. (2) In his *Abstract*, summarizing the important ideas developed in his *Treatise*, he explicitly says that he regards his original contribution to consist in this use of the principle of the imagination to "cement" together our knowledge of nature.

> . . . If any thing can intitle the author to so glorious a name as inventor, 'tis the use he makes of the principle of the association of ideas, which enters into most of his philosophy. . . . 'Twill be easy to conceive of what vast consequence these principles must be in the science of human nature, if we consider that so far as regards the mind, these are the only links that bind the parts of the universe together, or connect us with any person or object exterior to ourselves . . . and these are the only ties of our thoughts, they are really *to us* the cement of the universe, and all the operations of the mind must, in a great measure, depend upon them.[17]

This passage is even more important because it occurs as the last sentence in Hume's summary of his long original *Treatise*. Hume's originality consists in pioneering this new sense of "knowing," which, *if accepted*, will escape the scepticism inherent in the strict epistemologies.

This interpretation of Hume, besides being in accordance with his *Treatise* and his *Enquiry* and besides being the one that Hume himself placed upon his monumental *Treatise* in his summarizing *Abstract*, is also the way in which Hume was understood by Kant, one of the very few intellects who have shown themselves capable

[14] *Ibid.*, Book I, Part III, Sections I and III.

[15] Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. by J. A. St. John (London, Bell, 1876), Sec. IV, Pt. II.

[16] Descartes, *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, Rule III.

[17] Hume, *An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. by J. M. Keynes and P. Sraffa (Cambridge University Press, 1938), pp. 31–32.

of comprehending Hume's original work and perceiving the crucial juncture at which Hume is to be evaluated. In his *Prolegomena,* which was a summary of his *Critique of Pure Reason* and in which he is at pains to state his relations to Hume, Kant has emphasized that Hume no more denied causality than any other philosopher but rather was busy to inquire by what right we hold to this principle that lies at the root of all our inferred knowledge, and that Hume, perceiving the fatal defects in all answers hitherto given to this question, set theory of knowledge on a new path by trying to establish the principle of causality on a new basis.

II

In order to see whether Russell answers Hume in any sense by giving better reasons for accepting his causal postulates than Hume gave for his, it will be necessary now to show what Russell's positive reasons are for accepting his postulates. But when this is done, the areas of agreement with Hume are found to be so large that it is difficult to see how Russell has answered Hume's so-called scepticism, for Russell's account also may be summarized in seven theses, the first six of which are the same as Hume's negative work, which Russell accepts *in toto,* and the seventh of which is ambiguous in a crucial way to be discussed presently.

As regards the first six theses constituting Hume's negative work, there is complete agreement, for Russell also emphasizes all six of the following corresponding theses: (I) the thesis of the indispensability of his causal postulates for non-demonstrative inferences;[18] (II) the thesis of non-analyticity, that these causal principles are not logically necessary but are synthetic statements;[19] (III) the thesis of generality, that they can not be verified by direct observation alone simply because they are general;[20] (IV) the thesis of non-inferribility of these principles from observation and inductive principles without question-begging;[21] (V) the thesis that these causal principles can not be known at all in the strict traditional conception of knowledge which allows only propositions that are self-evident and those inferred from self-evident propositions;[22] (VI) the hypothetical thesis of solipsistic scepticism, that

[18] Russell, "My Mental Development," p. 16; "Reply to Criticisms," pp. 718–719; *Human Knowledge,* pp. xii–xiii, 174–175, 452, 505–507.

[19] Russell, "Reply to Criticisms," pp. 783; *Human Knowledge,* pp. xv, 174–175, 459.

[20] Russell, *Human Knowledge,* p. 174.

[21] Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (London, Williams and Norgate, 1912), pp. 100, 106–108; *Human Knowledge,* p. 337.

[22] Russell, *Human Knowledge,* pp. 155–156, 179–180, 421, 507.

if we adhere to this strict conception of knowledge which will not enable one to acknowledge these causal principles as known in some good and new sense of "know," then solipsism of the present moment results.[23]

Russell, like Hume, however, is unwilling to concede that the required postulates are unknown and to accept the solipsism that would result from this concession. Instead, he emphasizes throughout *Human Knowledge* that the old strict and narrow self-evidence conception of knowledge must be rejected and a wider conception be developed, so that, in terms of this liberalized conception of knowledge, we may be said to know the causal principles needed to build up knowledge and escape solipsism.[24] This again is in perfect agreement with Hume's doctrine.

But what, according to Russell, is this new sense, in which we may be said to know the principles required to justify common-sense and scientific inferences? Hume gave a definite and unambiguous answer, in terms of his doctrine of the laws of the imagination. Does Russell have a correspondingly clear account? If so, what is it? And does it give us reasons for accepting his postulates that are (a) different from Hume's and (b) better than Hume's? This brings us to the crux of the question.

Russell has much to say on this topic, one of his favorites throughout *Human Knowledge*,[25] but what he says is unclear and disunified. In broad outline, his answer is that we believe the postulates in the sense that we all do in fact generalize in accordance with them. This is another way of saying that they are implicit assumptions which govern our generalization tendencies. Russell states this explicitly in the concluding chapter of *Human Knowledge*, a chapter devoted entirely to the epistemological question in what sense we may be said to know the postulates necessary and sufficient for inferring empirical generalizations from observed facts.

> *Our knowledge of these principles—if it can be called "knowledge"—exists at first solely in the form of a propensity to inferences of the kind that they justify.* It is by reflection upon such inferences that we make the principles explicit. And when they have been made explicit, we can use logical technique to improve the form in which they are stated, and to remove unnecessary accretions.

[23] Russell, *Human Knowledge*, pp. 175–181. This is an entire chapter given to developing this hypothesis and rejecting both its antecedent and consequent.

[24] Russell, *Human Knowledge*, pp. xv–xvi, 154–158, 182–188, 421, 426–433, 497.

[25] The main discussions of this problem occur in *Human Knowledge*, where the problem first receives emphatic treatment from Russell; these discussions are concentrated chiefly in the following passages: pp. 421–431, 494–496, 496–507; also, less systematically, pp. 174–181.

> The principles are "known" in a different sense from that in which particular facts are known. *They are known in the sense that we generalize in accordance with them when we use experience to persuade us of a universal proposition such as* "Dogs bark." As mankind have advanced in intelligence, their inferential habits have come gradually nearer to agreement with the laws of nature which have made these habits, throughout, more often a source of true expectations than of false ones. The forming of inferential habits which lead to true expectations is part of the adaptation to the environment upon which biological survival depends.[26]

If we are willing to accept this psychological statement that we do in fact believe the postulates in the sense that we generalize in accordance with them and in this sense know them, there still remains in Russell's account of our knowledge of them one fundamental ambiguity, so serious that, unless it can be cleared away, his account must be regarded as fatally disunified. The ambiguity, roughly stated, is this: Is Russell accepting a kind of Kantian view that these modes of generalization are congenital predispositions of the minded organism? Or is he taking a kind of Humean view that they are acquired habits of generalization which, though they can not be inferred from sequences in experience, are nevertheless generated in us by these sequences in experience? Russell tends to answer both ways. To be sure, whichever way one answers, it will still be the case that we generalize in accordance with those principles. But until it be indicated in what way we come to generalize according to them, the program of defining in what sense we know them is left in utter obscurity and therefore Russell's claim to have answered Hume as well as to have provided a basis for substantial inferences is left undecided at its very foundation.

The following passage, repudiating all dependence of the postulates upon experience for their credibility, supports a Kantian interpretation of the sense in which the principles needed for empirical knowledge are themselves known:

> In practice, experience leads us to generalizations, such as "Dogs bark." As a starting point for science, it suffices if such generalizations are true in a large majority of cases. But although experience of barking dogs suffices to *cause* belief in the generalization "Dogs bark," it does not, by itself, give any ground for believing that this is true in untested cases. If experience is to give such a ground, it must be supplemented by causal principles such as will make certain kinds of generalization antecedently plausible. *These principles, if assumed, lead to results which are in conformity with experience, but this fact does not logically suffice to make the principles even probable.*[27]

This quasi-Kantian account, usually stated in biological terminology, pervades a very large number of crucial passages.[28]

[26] Russell, *Human Knowledge*, p. 507. The italics are not in the original.
[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 506–507. Italics are not in the original.
[28] *Ibid.*, pp. xv, 192, 429, 495, 507.

But in many other passages Russell seems to hold the doctrine that our knowledge of the postulates of causality consists purely of *acquired habits of expectation* generated in us by the very same sequences in experience which provide the factual support for inferred special causal laws. In so far as Russell grounds the postulates in this manner, he is defending them on exactly the same ground on which Hume supported his doctrine of universal causation. On this interpretation, our unreconstructed pre-verbal knowledge both of the postulates and of special causal laws consists in the possession of certain habits acquired according to the usual laws of habit formation.

One of the clearest of passages supporting this Humean interpretation is the following:

> "Knowledge," in my opinion, is a much less precise conception than is generally thought, and has its roots more deeply embedded in unverbalized animal behavior than most philosophers have been willing to admit. *The logically basic assumptions to which our analysis leads us are psychologically the end of a long series of refinements which starts from habits of expectation in animals, such as that what has a certain kind of smell will be good to eat.* To ask, therefore, whether we "know" the postulates of scientific inference is not so definite a question as it seems. The answer must be: in one sense, yes, in another sense, no; but in the sense in which "no" is the right answer we know nothing whatever, and "knowledge" in this sense is a delusive vision. The perplexities of philosophers are due, in a large part, to their unwillingness to awaken from this blissful dream.[29]

According to this passage our only knowledge of the postulates consists in our having acquired habits of expectation which we may later exhibit by analysis in language. The same psychology of belief which covers animal expectation (a pre-verbal knowledge of a special causal law) is also said to apply to our general beliefs in the postulates. What is more, if such habit-knowledge of them is not counted as knowledge, then we know nothing at all except, of course, analytic and basic propositions. This Humean account of the postulates also runs throughout Russell's *Human Knowledge*.[30]

The inducements, therefore, which Russell gives us for accepting his brilliantly formulated postulates are three in number, one of which is logical and two of which are mutually exclusive epistemological inducements: (1) The postulates are logically indispensable to the derivation of common-sense and scientific conclusions which we all accept and can not sincerely reject. This *logical* inducement leaves open the epistemological question concerning the sense in which we know the postulates and must be supplemented with a

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. xv–xvi. The italics are not in the original.
[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 182–195, 427, 432.

clearly defined epistemological accompaniment. But Russell gives two mutually exclusive answers: (2) The postulates are known in the sense that, in addition to being true and never leading to false expectations, they are *congenital predispositions* toward empirical generalizations which are, fortunately, roughly in accordance with the course of nature. (3) The postulates are known in the sense that, in addition to being true and never leading to false expectations, they are *acquired habits of expectation* in accordance with which we generalize, on the basis of observation, roughly in accordance with the course of nature.

Before turning to the question whether Russell answers Hume in any sense, we may ask and indeed must ask: How may Russell best clear up this disunity in his account of the sense in which the postulates are known? Obviously, he may choose the Kantian side or the Humean side of his doctrine, but not both. But each of these alternatives has its difficulties for him.

If the Kantian account be taken, then Russell needs to show how, if our modes of generalization are grounded in the nature of our understanding or otherwise embedded in our psychological predispositions, they can nevertheless be used as bases for inferences beyond experience. Kant concluded that, because our principles making possible empirical inference are themselves *a priori* synthetic principles not derived from experience but brought to experience by the mind and making knowledge possible, our knowledge is confined to objects in experience. Russell, therefore, if he is to accept a version of Kant's *a priorism*, might be expected to show how he can at the same time escape the phenomenalism which Kant regarded as an inevitable consequence. Because he does not do so, his effort, at times, to combine the Kantian *a priorism* with his own realistic metaphysics and causal theory of perception seems to this sympathetic critic to ignore completely one of the great historical protests against such a combination.

Actually, Russell seems usually to adhere to the Humean account, and I shall assume that he would clear up the disunity by dropping the alien Kantian account. If Russell does accept the Humean account of the sense in which we know these postulates, the difficulty of avoiding phenomenalism does not appear to be acute.[31] The causal processes of nature generate in us habits of expectation

[31] I am not sure of this point. Hume at times, especially in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part IV, Section II, seems to argue that if our habits of inductive inference are generated by experience, their applicability is confined to experience. If he were correct, his account, no less than Kant's different one, would terminate in phenomenalism and so would Russell's Humean side.

which parallel, roughly, the habits of nature; thus it is no surprise, Russell points out, if we can use these postulates to infer the course of the physical world.[32]

But other difficulties of an acute sort are created for Russell by his retaining the Humean account.

III

Actually, Russell conceives *Human Knowledge* to contain as its central contribution an escape from Hume's alleged scepticism.[33] But if Russell adopts Hume's inducement for accepting his principles of non-demonstrative inference, this claim that he has answered Hume must be mistaken.

First of all, it is clear that Russell does interpret Hume's logic of non-demonstrative inference, which centers in his critique of the principle of causality, as one which terminates in complete solipsism.[34] This is the usual misinterpretation of Hume given by his hasty critics. Russell summarizes his conventional interpretation of "Hume's destruction of empiricism" in the following unconventionally blunt manner:

> It is therefore important to discover whether there is any answer to Hume within the framework of a philosophy that is wholly or mainly empirical. If not, there is no intellectual difference between sanity and insanity. The lunatic who believes that he is a poached egg is to be condemned solely on the ground that he is in a minority, or rather—since we must not assume democracy—on the ground that the government does not agree with him. This is a desperate point of view, and it must be hoped that there is some way of escaping from it.[35]

But what is more important, Russell tells us that Hume's system terminates in the epistemological bankruptcy of solipsism precisely because it rejects the principle of universal causality[36] *for lack of any reasons for accepting it* and must deny therefore all knowledge of generalizations and of unobserved particular facts.[37]

Russell, however, has said that his own logic of non-demonstrative inference does not terminate in scepticism *and that he has answered Hume*. This, as has been indicated, is equivalent to the claim

[32] Russell, *Human Knowledge*, p. 507.

[33] Passages supporting this judgment by Russell were cited at the outset.

[34] Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, pp. 659, 667–668, 672–674; *Human Knowledge*, pp. 174–175, 467.

[35] Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, p. 673.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 673–674.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 671: "It is evident that he started out with a belief that scientific method yields the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; he ended, however, with the conviction that belief is never rational, since *we know nothing.*" Italics not in the original.

that he has given reasons for accepting his postulates which are both (1) different from and (2) better than those given by Hume for his principle of universal causation. This claim may now be evaluated, the two systems having been laid along side one another.

My conclusion has already been exhibited by my comparison of Hume and Russell: Russell has not answered the so-called Humean scepticism because *both Hume and Russell accept general principles of causality as a basis for inferred knowledge and accept them for exactly the same reasons.* Therefore, Russell's reasons can not be better than Hume's. If, as Russell insists, Hume's system collapses into solipsism for lack of sufficient grounds for accepting his causal principle, then Russell's postulates, resting on exactly the same grounds, collapse for precisely the same reason.

It is not being maintained at all that Russell's postulates and Hume's principle of causality are the same. Rather, Russell's doctrine of causality, which centers in his structural postulate, is different from and much more carefully formulated than Hume's and, if accepted, will justify a far wider range of inferences than can be justified by Hume's. In this and other respects Russell's logic of non-demonstrative inference is far superior to Hume's. What is being asserted is that they offer the same inducements for believing their respective causal principles. Either Hume does not need refuting since his reasons for his causal principle are sufficient, or Russell's refutation of him is also self-refuting because Russell accepts the same reasons for his causal principles. In either case Russell joins those who have tried in vain to refute Hume. He has made no progress in the long historical struggle to produce a firmer basis for inferred knowledge than Hume provided.

Perhaps it would be possible to state the main alternative ways in which one might go about "answering" Hume; then it will be seen that Russell has not adopted either one of them and thus has, like most of Hume's critics, not even fully recognized what would constitute an "answer" to Hume's alleged scepticism.

Accepting the Cartesian-Humean emphasis upon the indispensability of the principle of causality as a premise in all inductive arguments, but conceding, as one must, that this principle is not intuitively self-evident to the senses or reason and is not derivable from such certainties, one may find some basis for the principle of causality in the very nature of the understanding. This is the Kantian approach.

Or, denying that the principle of causality is an indispensable basis for inductive arguments, one might maintain that all legitimate inductive conclusions, including the principle of causality, are in-

ferrible from observational statements and the principles of a pure logic of probability. This is an approach recently undertaken by Carnap.

In both of these approaches the retorters to Hume agree with Hume that inductive conclusions are to be "justified" if at all by exhibiting them as conclusions implied by premises which we have reason to believe independently of the conclusions. Thus, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Carnap, and Russell all hold to a kind of geometric or "linear" conception of inferring empirical conclusions from independently established premises.

But one may reject this geometric conception of inferring empirical conclusions and adopt a third way of replacing Hume's logic of induction. In this, which is very difficult to state even roughly, a knowledge-claim about matters of fact may be said to be acceptably established if it, better than any other rival claim, fits into a system of mutually supporting knowledge-claims, some of which are observational statements. This is not wholly foreign to the so-called coherence theory, embedded in the Hegelian tradition but here interpreted as a theory of evidence, not of truth, and modified by an empiricist emphasis upon inclusion of as many observational statements as possible within a given cluster of mutually supporting knowledge-claims.

My own inclination would be to accept Hume's position or, if forced to reject it, to look hopefully toward the third method, in which one abandons altogether the hope of exhibiting knowledge-claims about unobserved matters of fact as deducible from selected premises by ordinary geometrical methods of reasoning.

It is because Russell has not followed any of these alternatives to Hume but has adopted Hume's own reasons for accepting his causal postulates for non-demonstrative inference, that he has failed to present any theory that could be called "an answer to Hume."

IV

Because Russell strangely claims to have answered Hume by a logic of empirical inference which at the critical point is Humean, it can only be concluded that he overlooked important features of Hume's system which are fundamental to the systems of Hume and Russell alike. In terms of my own previous exposition of Hume's epistemology, Russell's oversight can be indicated precisely. Russell has found in Hume and fully assimilated into his own system Hume's first six theses, all of which are destructive, showing that an epistemology which allows only self-evident propositions of

reason and sense and propositions inferred from such premises inevitably leads to solipsism by forcing one to conclude that the indispensable principle of causality is itself utterly unknowable. But Russell, like most of Hume's critics, did not see that Hume rejected this epistemology and its solipsistic outcome and created a liberalized conception of knowledge which, like Russell's own, traces knowledge to habits embedded in animal behavior and not only *accepts the universal principle of causality as known in the new and liberalized sense of "know" but also accepts all the inferred knowledge which this principle, once accepted, allows us to draw from observation.* Only by missing this constructive, original, and central portion of Hume's philosophy could Russell maintain that Hume rejected the principle of causality.[38]

Had Russell found in the *Treatise* what Hume himself judged to be his original contribution to philosophy, or had he accepted Kant's evaluation of the true proportions and character of Hume's positive contribution, he would have seen that his own constructive account of the sense in which we know the postulates required for non-demonstrative inference is identical with Hume's, and so have helped us to a juster sense of the historical importance of his own work. He would thus transform his recurring claim to have answered Hume's alleged scepticism into a frank restatement, in support of his ingenious postulates, of the reasons which Hume gave for his, reasons which, if sufficient to warrant our acceptance of general principles of causality, would relieve both systems alike of scepticism, and which, if rejected, would reduce both alike to solipsism.

Russell, then, seems to be wholly mistaken concerning the *historical significance* of his logic of non-demonstrative inference.

Whether either Russell's or Hume's logic of science is acceptable is a further question in serious critical philosophy and one that should be treated on a separate occasion.

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HAS JAMES ANSWERED HUME?

I

AMERICAN empiricism as sponsored by William James had the advantage over traditional forms of empiricism in that it lived up to its own commitment to the fullest extent. It is "radical"

[38] Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, pp. 672–674.

because it grants no intellectual credit to anything that is not cashable in a world of pure experience on the one hand, and it will not hesitate to grant credit to anything that is cashable in a world of pure experience on the other. "To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced."[1]

Armed with this kind of "matter of fact" toughmindedness, James solved one of the most delicate philosophical problems, i.e., the reality of relations; and as a logical corollary, the reality of universals.

To James, "the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system."[2] To be more specific, "We ought to say a feeling of *and*, a feeling of *if*, a feeling of *but*, and a feeling of *by*, quite as readily as we say a feeling of blue or a feeling of cold."[3]

To feel an "and," or an "if," is not the same as to know about a relation of *and* or *if*. To James, relations can be a knowledge of acquaintance as well as a knowledge-about. To use Dewey's terms, relation is not only to be mediately known, but it can be immediately had. We live in relations just as we know about relations. It is in this kind of state of being that the reality of relation is metaphysically warranted.

Philosophically, this insight is of tremendous significance. It answered Hume's question squarely once and for all on the one hand and tore apart the superfluous idealistic structure by the one and the same stroke on the other hand. It is well known that Hume was skeptical about causal relations. If causality is a relation, then, according to James, it can be "had" as well as known. And the reality of the causal relations is insured in this kind of state of having.[4]

To speak in plain language, we ought to say a feeling of *because* quite as readily as we say a feeling of blue. If Hume had no

[1] James, W., *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 42.

[2] James, W., *Ibid.*, p. 42.

[3] James, W., *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 245.

[4] James, W., "But in this actual world of ours, as it is given, a part at least of the activity comes with definite direction; it comes with desire and sense of goal; it comes complicated with resistances which it overcomes or succumbs to, and with the efforts which the feeling of resistance so often provokes; and it is in complex experiences like these that the notions of distinct agents, and of passivity as opposed to activity arise. Here also the notion of causal efficacy comes to birth." *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 163. Also pp. 181–189.

misgivings about our "impression" of blue, why did he particularly pick on the "impression" of *because*?

It goes without saying that, to James, the "truth" of a specific causal relationship can not be verified by our feeling alone. However, the fact that we do have a direct feeling of causality is the most direct demonstration of the fact that causal relationship is "real," although it is not necessarily always "true." Furthermore, since causal relations as well as any other relations, such as "similarity" or "likeness," which is the basis of our inductive generalization, can be immediately had, experienced, and known by acquaintance, any transcendental synthetic power, whether it is invested in Kant's transcendental ego or in the post-Kantians' Absolute, becomes a superfluous thing.[5]

In this respect, we can see that James was more of a realist than Dewey. For in treating the problem of generality, Dewey seems to be very much influenced by Kant, despite his unique instrumental-empirical orientation.[6] It is true, as Dewey has pointed out, that a child learns to generalize through applying such a concept as "dog" to an actual horse as "big dog"; the child, on the other hand, is most unlikely to apply the same concept to his father. Now, what makes the difference? If we remember that James would allow "similarity" or "likeness" as a relation to be directly experienced,[7] then generality or pattern need not always come from one pole—the organism—from the very beginning.

James thus answered Hume's question about the reality of the laws of nature by taking a very naive, yet disarming position: We believe that relations as embodied in the laws of nature are real simply because we can perceive them immediately. By the same insight, James answered Hume's second question about the reality of an integrated ego, self, or I. For it is well known that Hume, by using the same seemingly devastating analytical technique, destroyed Berkeley's self as he destroyed Locke's external natural order. To James, the fact that an I is an I is just a fact, directly perceivable. It is absolutely unnecessary to have an intellectual power such as that demonstrated in Kant's transcendental apperception.

When Descartes tried to prove that I exist by the reason that I think, he was indeed making a tautological statement. But if we

[5] James, W., *Ibid.*, p. 103.
[6] Dewey, J., *How We Think*, pp. 129–130.
[7] James, W., *Ibid.*, p. 45.

point to the fact that the I who thinks now is the same I who wrote the last sentence, we are verifying an existential situation. Whether the verification is a success or a failure, in the last resort, it is aesthetically to be had, not intellectually to be known. In order to verify the existence of an I, the only methodological postulate required is that all relations can be immediately perceived eventually. Since I, ego, or self is one of the most intimate relations in the universe and can be directly and immediately perceived, therefore, existentially, not only intellectually, I, self, or ego is real.[8]

II

To James, therefore, relations belong primarily to the realm of being. Knowing, instead of legislating relations into being, is itself a specific kind of being as relation. As being, the knowing-known relation is primarily not a subversive or privileged function in nature. It is specific but not special. It is normal but not omnipresent. It is important but not monopolistic. Contemporary philosophers could have shaken off the whole traditional epistemological burden if they had learned from William James's insight that after all metaphysics is the foundation of epistemology, not vice versa.

To know is to be in a knowing-known relation. A man, conducting an inquiry, is having an experience of the process of inquiry which as a whole is possible, simply because it is actual. Knowing is actually an act of relating. As an act, it is to be had. The known that is to be intellectually formulated as a proposition is to be maintained, disputed, or refuted on the existential basis of verifications which are step by step fluent acts of relating. Ideally, all these steps should be satisfactory in the medium of perception or feeling which are to be had as states of being. It is in this way that knowing or perceiving terminates in a known as objective being which is verified by the very knowing process as independent of knowing. (In this sense, knowing is a good illustration of Hegel's negation, negating subjectivity through feelings.) Feelings to be had constitute not only the intellectual reason but also the existential ground of our belief in objective facts, although they are by no means the efficient causes of these facts as solipsists would maintain.

Existentially, knowing would be impossible unless we recognize the fact, first of all, that relations are real and can be perceived or had directly, and secondly, that knowing, especially verification, in

[8] James, W., *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 400–401.

the medium of our actual act of relating relates our idea to outside fact.[9]

In this light, we can see how William James was a metaphysical realist in the sense that: (1) even in treating problems about knowing he took knowing essentially as an activity in the realm of being; (2) the nature of knowing is the nature of a relation between two types of being in which one type—the ideatic or perceiving type—finally terminates in or coalesces with another type—the existential or the perceived type; (3) the success or failure of knowing is finally determined in the state of being, and consequently knowing, instead of positing being, presupposes being all the way through; and (4) knowing is possible because relations are real beings, not intellectual categories.

William James thus saved the tradition of metaphysical realism from the fatal analysis of Hume by pointing to a simple fact, that relations are real, and can be had and immediately perceived. On the other hand, in dealing with the reality of relation, James washed his hands of fantastic idealism in maintaining that (1) not all relations are internal and (2) relations are not everything in the universe. Disjunctions are as real as conjunctions. Combining these two points, we have a theory of being called concatenatism:

> Radical empiricism takes conjunctive relations at their face value, holding them to be as real as the terms united by them. The world it represents as a collection, some parts of which are conjunctively and others disjunctively related. Two parts, themselves disjoined, may nevertheless hang together by intermediaries with which they are severally connected, and the whole world eventually may hang together similarly, inasmuch as *some* path of conjunctive transition by which to pass from one of its parts to another may always be discernible. Such determinately various hanging-together may be called concatenated union, to distinguish it from the "through-and-through" type of union, "each in all and all in each" (union of *total conflux*, as one might call it), which monistic systems hold to obtain when things are taken in their absolute reality. In a concatenated world a partial conflux often is experienced. Our concepts and our sensations are confluent; successive states of the same ego, and feelings of the same body are confluent. Where the experience is not of conflux, it may be of conterminousness (things with but one thing between); or of contiguousness (nothing between); or of likeness; or of nearness; or of simultaneousness; or of simple with-ness, or even of mere and-

[9] James, W., "Knowledge of sensible realities thus comes to life inside the tissue of experience. It is *made*; and made by relations that unroll themselves in time. Whenever certain intermediaries are given, such that, as they develop towards their terminus, there is experience from point to point of one direction followed, and finally of one process fulfilled, the result is that *their starting-point thereby becomes a knower and their terminus an object meant or known.* That is all that knowing (in the simple case considered) can be known-as, that is the whole of its nature, put into experiential terms." *Ibid.*, p. 57.

ness, which last relation would make of however disjointed a world otherwise, at any rate for that occasion a universe "of discourse."[10]

In a sense, James's concatenatism is as naive as it can be. Because of this, it may sound rather dogmatic to professional philosophers. On the other hand, this naive theory may have tremendous significance in dealing with other types of philosophical problems which James himself did not discuss.

For example: Concerning mathematical truths, such as "1 and 1 are 2," philosophers of science, until now, have had no conclusive ideas. The traditional distinction between analytic judgment and synthetic judgment with all its epistemological ramifications can be traced back to this simple riddle: What are the real natures of these various mathematical propositions? Are they deduced propositions from arbitrary definitions and therefore analytic judgments? Or are they synthetic judgments *a priori* as Kant maintained? Or are they empirical verifiable judgments?

If we take James's position that relations are real, then we may look at such propositions as "1 and 1 are 2" as mathematical relations which can be directly perceived and real. By real, of course, we do not imply that these relations are always true in the sense of being verified, for the simple reason that being verified and being verifiable are two different things. The important point is rather: whether true or false, they are true or false in an empirical world and just because they are existing in an empirical world, their truth or falsity has definite meanings.

Furthermore, as long as they are existing in an empirical universe, they may eventually be verified or they may remain permanently as fairy tales. James's world of pure experience is an open universe which does not exist for the sole purpose of bearing witness to truth or falsity. It is rather an open opportunity for the adventure of ideas which is so characteristic of mathematics. On the other hand, the adventure will not become a foolhardy risk because the possibility of empirical verification is always there. No one can elaborate this point more beautifully than James himself did when he said:

> . . . To recur to the Memorial Hall example lately used, it is only when our idea of the Hall has actually terminated in the percept that we know "for certain" that from the beginning it was truly cognitive of *that*. Until established by the end of the process, its quality of knowing that, or indeed of knowing anything, could still be doubted; and yet the knowing really was there, as the result now shows. We were *virtual* knowers of the Hall long before we were certified to have been its actual knowers, by the percept's retroactive validating power. Just so we are "mortal" all the time, by reason

[10] James, W., *Ibid.*, pp. 107–108.

of the virtuality of the inevitable event which will make us so when it shall have come.

Now the immensely greater part of all our knowing never gets beyond this virtual stage. It never is completed or nailed down. I speak not merely of our ideas of imperceptibles like ether-waves or dissociated "ions," or of "ejects" like the contents of our neighbors' minds; I speak also of ideas which we might verify if we would take the trouble, but which we hold for true although unterminated perceptually, because nothing says "no" to us, and there is no contradicting truth in sight. *To continue thinking unchallenged is, ninety-nine times out of a hundred, our practical substitute for knowing in the completed sense.* As each experience runs by cognitive transition into the next one, and we nowhere feel a collision with what we elsewhere count as truth or fact, we commit ourselves to the current as if the port were sure. We live, as it were, upon the front edge of an advancing wave-crest, and our sense of a determinate direction in falling forward is all we cover of the future of our path. It is as if a differential quotient should be conscious and treat itself as an adequate substitute for a traced-out curve. Our experience, *inter alia*, is of variations of rate and of directions, and lives in these transitions more than in the journey's end. The experiences of tendency are sufficient to act upon—what more could we have *done* at those moments even if the later verification comes complete? [11]

Another example which may illustrate the significance of James's contribution is the problem about values. In addition to the so-called formal sciences, of which mathematics is one, the so-called normative sciences have long embarrassed empiricists and encouraged both solipsists and supernaturalists or transcendentalists. The story is well known in the history of philosophy. Concerning value, the outstanding problem is that of value standards. What is a standard and where does it come from, and how does the standard justify itself before it justifies its derivative values? Is it not evident that there are two and only two alternatives? Either the standard of value comes from a transcendental source, thus occupying a higher status, or the whole matter about values, including standards, is relative to subjective preference without the possibility of any rational justification at all. Thus we have to choose between a transcendental axiology and a solipsistic axiology just as we have to choose between a transcendental epistemology and a solipsistic epistemology.

This dilemma exists when and only when we presuppose that any value judgment is a judgment in terms of entities and value choice is an act isolated from any background. As a matter of fact, this is not true. For value judgment is essentially a judgment in and about relations. When we say that A is good and B is bad, what we really mean is that A is better than B. This "better than" is a relation which can be had or immediately perceived. Of course, this immediate reaction need not always be rational in

[11] James, W., *Ibid.*, pp. 68–69.

view of further scrutiny. But the realness of our value judgment, whether it is right or wrong, is embodied in this directly perceived relation. Valuing, as knowing, is possible simply because it is actual. If value is a relation, then standard of value will cease to be a thorny problem. For only when good and bad are separate entities, do we need a third entity to serve as standard. If good and bad are co-present in the "better than" relation, then the standard is empirically immanent in the relation. In this connection, even the concept "emergent" is dispensable.

The relational nature of value is more evident in our value choice. For a choice is inevitably a choice between or a choice among, which is relational. What we call rational choice is only further study of the subtler relations involved so that the choice will be a realistic choice in the sense that all the beings involved can function in a harmonious relation. In this light, Dewey's classical analysis of means-end continuum comprehends much more than vulgar pragmatism. It has profound metaphysical implications which Dewey himself has brought out in such religious statements as:

> We recur to our fundamental propositions. Morals is connected with actualities of existence, not with ideas, ends and obligations independent of concrete actualities. The facts upon which it depends are those which arise out of active connections of human beings with one another, the consequences of their mutually intertwined activities in the life of desire, belief, judgment, satisfaction and dissatisfaction. In this sense conduct and hence morals are social: they are not just things which *ought* to be social and which fail to come up to the scratch.
>
> . . . Infinite relationships of man with his fellows and with nature already exist. The ideal means, as we have seen, a sense of these encompassing continuities with their infinite reach. This meaning even now attaches to present activities because they are set in a whole to which they belong and which belongs to them. Even in the midst of conflict, struggle and defeat a consciousness is possible of the enduring and comprehending whole.
>
> . . . every act may carry within itself a consoling and supporting consciousness of the whole to which it belongs and which in some sense belongs to it. With responsibility for the intelligent determination of particular acts may go a joyful emancipation from the burden for responsibility for the whole which sustains them, giving them their final outcome and quality. There is a conceit fostered by perversion of religion which assimilates the universe to our personal desires; but there is also a conceit of carrying the load of the universe from which religion liberates us. Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them. In its presence we put off mortality and live in the universal.[12]

Thus Dewey fulfills James's anticipation. For was it not James himself who predicted: "Let empiricism once become associated with religion, as hitherto, through some strange misunderstanding,

[12] Dewey, J., *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 329–332.

it has been associated with irreligion, and I believe that a new era of religion as well as of philosophy will be ready to begin." [18]

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COMMUNICATION

THE CONCEPT OF MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION IN EAST AND WEST

Under this topic UNESCO convened a symposium at New Delhi, India, December 13–20, 1951. Delegates present were J. T. Christie (U. K.), Albert Béguin (Switzerland), Ras-Vihary Das (India), Clarence H. Faust (U. S. A.), H. v. Glasenapp (Germany), Humayun Kabir (Secretary, Ministry of Education, Government of India), Yensho Kanakura (Japan), Ibrahim Madkour (Egypt), Prof. Pisanelli (Italy), André Rousseaux (France), Jaques Rueff (France), Malala Sekhara (Ceylon), H. Z. Ulken (Turkey), A. R. Wadia (India); S. Radhakrishnan, presiding. Observers were permitted to attend most sessions. The address of welcome was delivered by the Honorable Maulana A. K. Azad, Minister of Education, Government of India. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru addressed the final meeting. The final report will not appear for some time. Each delegate submitted a paper which was summarized by him and discussed in the meetings. Observers were given a few minutes to participate.

Only about one third of the delegates were professors of philosophy, many were men of literary careers, not all were educators. By no means could the delegates be said to have been representatives of all types of philosophy and education East and West. The Western delegates were in large measure poorly acquainted with Eastern concepts. The reverse could not be said of the Eastern delegates.

Among those present there was, from the first, an "undercurrent of agreement" (Faust) on basic assumptions. Most Western delegates pleaded for a new type of humanism (e.g., Rousseaux). They were, on the whole, critical of the overemphasis on science and the role of reason in society, but the word "reason" was taken with many connotations (Faust). A plea for education as the process of rationalization came from the East (Das). Rationalism, however, was believed to contain the seeds of materialism (Ulken).

Sharp criticism was pointed at Western absorption in technological processes. Most ills were blamed on the tool and machinery. The West was more self-critical than the East, which claimed greater tolerance (Kanakura, Kabir). Overspecialization was con-

[18] James, W., *Ibid.*, p. xiii.

demned (Wadia *et al.*). A new category of specialization with a universal outlook was then advocated (Rueff). The concept of progress was recommended for revision (Béguin *et al.*) and the concept of gradual progress in East and West came up for discussion (v. Glasenapp). The allegation that ethics in the West developed independently of religion in contradistinction from the East (Wadia) and hence had less of retarding influence upon society was refuted for the Muslim world which recognizes a "civilian ethics" (Madkour). Friction between cultures was termed useful (Christie) but condemned if it leads to immobility and clash (Rueff). Thinking in terms of cultural blocks was regarded as dangerous by the Chairman as well as M. Thomas, Head of Cultural Activities Department, UNESCO.

The plea for mutual understanding was made many times, likewise that for coöperation between East and West in which each side would abandon attitudes that have proved harmful internationally and historically. Thus, the undue stress on process in pragmatism should be offset by participation in Being (Faust). It became evident from the first that terms like "East" and "West" had little meaning, similar or identical attitudes being observed the world over. It was conceded that the West also had much spirituality. There are uncivilized regions even within civilized ones (Béguin). Cultural level is an international standard and is attained by individuals in different nations, not by the nations themselves (Das). UNESCO should sponsor retreats where people get together to do worthwhile thinking (Rueff).

It was the consensus that we need more philosophy in education. Philosophy is a means to happiness (Sekhara). It should not merely be a subject to be taught. All subjects should be taught philosophically (Faust). To philosophize means to be daring in thinking and humble in attitude (Kabir). Man should be reached through beauty, not duty (Pisanelli). Education is the "Itinerary of the human mind in God." There is to be no leveling of cultures; richness lies in symphonic diversity (Béguin). But there are international values and UNESCO was urged to establish a new scale (Madkour). We must orchestrate the best thoughts of mankind (Kabir).

Integration in the individual's personality as well as in society was stressed by Maulana Azad, while Pandit Nehru called upon the philosophers to make the common man's thinking articulate and thus avert the dangers of mental deterioration in the masses which is the ill effect of industrial development.

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VISVA-BHARATI, SANTINIKETAN

NEW BOOKS AND CURRENT JOURNALS

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

BADLEY, J. H.: *Form and Spirit; a Study in Religion.* Boston: Beacon Press. [1952.] xiii, 274 pp. $3.25.

BAILLIE, JOHN: *Natural Science and the Spiritual Life.* Being the Philosophical Discourse Delivered before the British Association for the Advancement of Science at Edinburgh on 12 August 1951. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1952. 43 pp. $1.75.

BERTOCCI, PETER ANTHONY: *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion.* New York: Prentice-Hall. 1951. xv, 565 pp. (Prentice-Hall Philosophy Series.) $4.75.

This book is written more for students who come through religion to philosophy than for those who come through philosophy to religion. The religious life is taken for granted, and the aim is to help students analyze religious problems philosophically. Furthermore, the aim is to understand religion in terms of the most modern philosophy. Hence this is a most useful text for American colleges and in general for students of religion who have no previous philosophical training. The systematic discussions of the central problems, the well-selected references and guides to reading and questioning are an excellent and conscientious introduction to philosophical thinking.

BIXLER, JULIUS SEELYE: *A Faith That Fulfills.* New York: Harper & Brothers. [1951.] 122 pp. $2.00.

CARNAP, RUDOLF: *The Continuum of Inductive Methods.* University of Chicago Press. [1952.] v, 92 pp. $3.50.

FONTAN, PIERRE: *Adhésion et dépassement.* Préface par Aimé Forest. Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts. 1952. x, 122 pp. $0.90 (45 fr. b.).

I. *Paradoxe du fini*: Adhésion à l'être. Recherche de Dieu. II. *Paradoxe du mal:* Mal et réflexion. Affirmation du mal. Dépassement du mal.

HEGEL, G. W. F.: *Science of Logic.* Translated by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers. With an Introductory Preface by Viscount Haldane of Cloan. [Second Impression.] London: Allen & Unwin. New York: Macmillan. [1951.] 2 vols. (The Muirhead Library of Philosophy.) $6.50.

MUELLER, GUSTAV E.: *Discourses on Religion.* New York: Bookman Associates. [1951.] 203 pp. $3.00.

PICARD, MAX: *The Flight from God.* With a Note on Max Picard by Gabriel Marcel and an Introduction by J. M. Cameron. Chicago: Henry Regnery. 1951. xxii, 185 pp. (The Humanist Library.) $2.50.

REICHELT, KARL LUDVIG: *Religion in Chinese Garment.* Translated

by Joseph Tetlie. New York: Philosophical Library. [1951.] 180 pp. (Lutterworth Library, Vol. XXXVI. Missionary Research Series, No. 16.) $4.50.

RUBIN, EDGAR: *Experimenta Psychologica.* Collected Scientific Papers in German, English & French, by Edgar Rubin, Professor of Experimental Psychology and Director of the Psychological Laboratory, Copenhagen University. Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard. 1949. 356 pp. $4.75.

SESSIONS, ROGER: *The Musical Experience of Composer, Performer, Listener.* Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1950. 127 pp. $2.50.

SIEGMUND, GEORG: *Das Zeichen des Widerspruches.* Fulda: Fuldaer Verlagsanstalt GMBH. 1952. 96 pp.

1. Das Menschenbild und seine Verengungen in den modernen Weltanschauungen. 2. Der Protest gegen Gott in den Weltanschauungen der Gegenwart. 3. Der Protest gegen Christus in den Weltanschauungen der Gegenwart. 4. Der Protest gegen die Kirche in den Weltanschauungen der Gegenwart.

THOMAS AQUINAS, SAINT: *Philosophical Texts.* Selected and Translated with Notes and an Introduction by Thomas Gilby. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1951. xxii, 405 pp. $3.00.

WHITTAKER, SIR EDMUND: *A History of the Theories of Aether and Electricity. I. The Classical Theories.* New York: Philosophical Library. [1951.] xiv, 434 pp. $12.00.

ANALYSIS. Vol. 12, No. 1. Oct. 1951. *Gilbert Ryle:* Ludwig Wittgenstein. *A. C. Ewing:* A New Formula for the Syllogism in Terms of the Ordinary Sense of 'Implication.' *Peter Minkus:* A Distinction between Simple and Complex Qualities. *Paul Wienpahl:* More about the Denial of Sameness of Meaning. *J. J. C. Smart:* The Theory of Types—a Further Note.

THE AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. Vol. XXIX, No. 2. Aug. 1951. Memoir—Ludwig Wittgenstein. *Otto Bondy:* Logical and Epistemological Problems in Legal Philosophy. *Denis Grey:* Subjectivity and the Aesthetic Use of Symbols (I). *John Mackie:* Logic and Professor Anderson.

GREGORIANUM. Vol. XXXII (1951), 2. Especially: *J. Murray:* The Ascent of Plotinus to God. *M. Ledrus:* Sur quelques pages inédites de Saint Jean de la Croix (II). *G. F. Klenk:* Das doppelte Gesicht Heideggers im Spiegel der jüngsten Kritik.—Vol. XXXII (1951), 3. Especially: *C. Bizzochi:* Gl'inni filosofici di Sinesio interpretati come mistiche celebrazioni. *M. Hurley:* Illumination according to S. Bonaventure. *B. Welte:* Ueber

den Grund der Möglichkeit des Bösen nach den Quaestiones disputatae de veritate des hl. Thomas von Aquin. *H. Freudenthal:* De fontibus geometriae in intuitione et abstractione quaerendis. *P. Hoenen:* De noetica geometriae: responsum ad animadversiones Clmi Freudenthal. *C. Vollert:* Recent Theology in the United States.

THE JOURNAL OF AESTHETIC & ART CRITICISM. Vol. X, No. 1, Sept. 1951. *Viktor Lowenfeld:* Psycho-Aesthetic Implications of the Art of the Blind. *Hilaire Hiler:* The Search for a Method of Graphic Expression. *Craig LaDrière:* The Problem of Plato's *Ion*. *Northrop Frye:* Poetry and Design in William Blake. *John E. Brown:* Neo-Platonism in the Poetry of William Blake. *Marcia Brown Bowman:* William Blake: a Study of His Doctrine of Art. *Richard Rudner:* On Semiotic Aesthetics.

JOURNAL DE PSYCHOLOGIE NORMALE ET PATHOLOGIQUE. 44e année, N° 3, Juill.-Sept. 1951. Especially: *R. Blanché:* Psychologie de la durée et physique du champ.

THE JOURNAL OF NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE. Vol. 114, No. 2, Aug. 1951. Especially: *A. E. Taft:* Mind, Brain and Psychoneurosis.

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES. Vol. II, No. 5, Oct. 1951. *W. V. Quine:* On Carnap's Views on Ontology. *Yehoshua Bar-Hillel:* A Note on State-Descriptions. *Rudolf Carnap:* The Problem of Relations in Inductive Logic.

PHILOSOPHY. THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY. Vol. XXVI, No. 99, Oct. 1951. *H. B. Acton:* Comte's Positivism and the Science of Society. *Harold Palmer:* Psychiatric Prolegomena: a Plea for the Help of Philosophy. *Hans Nystedt:* The Problem of Duty and Knowledge. *D. H. Munro:* Green, Rousseau, and the Culture Pattern. Philosophical Survey: German Philosophy.

PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST. Vol. I, No. 3, Oct. 1951. *Wilmon H. Sheldon and Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki:* On Philosophical Synthesis. *Howard L. Parsons:* Buddha and Buddhism: a New Appraisal. *S. K. Saksena:* Authority in Indian Philosophy. *S. C. Chatterjee:* The Needed Reform in Philosophy. *Gi-Ming Shien:* Nothingness in the Philosophy of Lao-tzŭ.

NOTES AND NEWS

Émile Bréhier, the noted French philosopher, died on February 3, 1952. Though he had been living in retirement for a number of years, he was still actively engaged in his studies and in the work of the International Institute of Philosophy. His loss will be felt throughout the community of philosophers.

Professor Laurence J. Lafleur, formerly of the Florida State University, is now at the University of Akron, Ohio, where he has been teaching since February 1.

Dr. Theodor Gaster will deliver a lecture, "New Chapters in Ancient Mythology, with Special Reference to Recently Discovered Ugaritic and Hittite Material and to Classical Myths," on Friday evening, March 16, at 8:30 o'clock in the Harkness Theatre, Columbia University, under the auspices of the Archaeological Institute of America.

At the annual meeting of the Southwestern Philosophical Conference at Houston, Texas, on December 28, 1951, the following officers were elected for 1952: President, Edward S. Robinson, University of Kansas; Vice-President, Carlton W. Berenda, University of Oklahoma; Secretary-Treasurer, Ian McGreal, Southern Methodist University; Additional Members of the Executive Committee, James S. Fulton, The Rice Institute; Robert L. Rein'l, Louisiana State University; Millard Scherich, Oklahoma A. & M. College.

The third annual meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America will be held in connection with Yale's 250th Anniversary Celebration, on March 22, 1952, in the Faculty Lounge, Hall of Graduate Studies, Yale University. The program is as follows:

10:30 A. M.
Mortimer J. Adler, "The Hierarchy of Essences."
John Wild, "Action, a Category of Existence."

1:30 P. M.
Paul Weiss, "The Past, Its Nature and Reality" (Presidential Address).
Isabel Stearns, "Creativity and the Other."

3:30 P. M.
Haskell Curry, "The Philosophy of Formal Systems."
Arthur Burks, "Ontological Categories for Language."

The meeting is open to all those who are interested. Those wishing to become members of the society should communicate with the secretary, Professor Ellen Haring, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Massachusetts. The membership fee is $1.00 annually.

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VOLUME XLVIII

No. 26. December 20, 1951.

Philosophy and Ordinary Language. D. J. O'Connor.

A Postscript on Sense-Data. Henry W. Johnstone, Jr.

VOLUME XLIX

No. 1. January 3, 1952.

Plausibility in Fiction. Robert T. Harris.

Review of James B. Conant's *Science and Common Sense* by Raphael Demos.

No. 2. January 17, 1952.

UNESCO Report on the Investigation Concerning Freedom. H. J. Pos.

No. 3. January 31, 1952.

Criteria of Explanation in History. E. W. Strong.

Some Aspects of Causation in History. E. J. Tapp.

No. 4. February 14, 1952.

Double Number.

On a Supposed Resurgence of Vicious Intellectualism. Arthur O. Lovejoy.

Mindless Empiricism. Sidney Hook.

In Defense of Individualistic Empiricism: A Reply to Messrs. Lovejoy and Hook. Victor Lowe.

Rejoinder to Mr. Lowe. Arthur O. Lovejoy.

Not Mindful Enough. Sidney Hook.

Note on a Not-So-Vicious Intellectualism. Herbert W. Schneider.

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